Ghosts of Anbar, Part III of IV
A Model for Success
Watch video footage of the culvert search here:
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An IP or IA fired three shots, apparently at a car.
A short time later, as we pulled away from the suspected bomb, SSG Lee said, “Ask him what he’s shootin’ at!” And then, “Hey, don’t shoot at the cars. ’Less they shoot at us, don’t shoot at ’em.”
After we pulled back from the suspected bomb, SSG Lee wanted to go talk with the Police at the Falahat train/police station, so we left the small group of Marines. SSG Lee and I headed out alone with Iraqis.
SSG Lee stressed to the Police that we needed statements, so people from Falahat came in and gave written statements. Iraqis respond to a sense of justice. The importance of this fact cannot be overstated, and it is this sense of justice on an international scale that gets undermined when people are held in prisons without being charged with any crimes.
To many of the Iraqis I’ve spoken with, terrorists are fair game. Kill them. But if we kill justice while doing so, we will create terrorists out of farmers. Here the Marines are creating farmers, police officers, shepherds, and entrepreneurs out of insurgents. To do that, they have to be seen as men who respect and honor legitimate systems of government and justice.
From the counterinsurgency manual that every Marine and Soldier should read:
1-119. The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring voluntary acceptance of a government’s authority and therefore its legitimacy. A government’s respect for preexisting and impersonal legal rules can provide the key to gaining it widespread, enduring societal support. Such government respect for rules—ideally ones recorded in a constitution and in laws adopted through a credible, democratic process—is the essence of the rule of law. As such, it is a powerful potential tool for counterinsurgents.
From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”
SSG Lee made sure the Iraqis treated them well during transport, and when we returned to the tiny base, Captain Koury told the Marines not to leave any of the prisoners alone with the Iraqis. The Iraqis can be rough on prisoners—the culture can be rough—but mentoring seems to be working where it occurs.
Back at the tiny base, the blindfolds on the shepherds were freaking out a puppy that someone had adopted. The puppy was growling and barking at the shepherds, but nobody paid attention until he got irritating. Then, someone picked him up and petted him and he finally shut up. The shepherds were released soon after.
The statements that SSG Lee had insisted that the police get from villagers led to the detainment of one “Mr. R,” and raids were planned based on information he provided.
The Persuasive Power of Character
From the counterinsurgency manual that every Marine and Soldier should read:
Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
1-149. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. . . . These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”
Earlier, at the Falahat station, I counted 24 armed Iraqis at one time, but there may have been as many as twice that. So it was just SSG Lee, me, and dozens of armed Iraqis. Some clearly had been insurgents just months ago. Nobody was denying it. Not us, not them. SSG Lee and I could have been killed or kidnapped at any time, yet I felt not a twinge of danger other than maybe watching for an enemy car bomb or sniper, or starting when someone accidentally fired a burst from an AK, which they occasionally do.
Now I started to understand why the Army officers had been telling me the Marines are more advanced in counterinsurgency. Normal Marines have morphed into doing vintage Special Forces work. Many of our Army units are excellent at this work, but the Marines, at least these particular Marines, did seem to have an edge for it.
They were even studying Arabic in their filthy little compound. Lightweight study, but they were showing the Iraqis they were making the effort. The Iraqis appreciated it. I have yet to see an Army unit undertake such a clear effort to learn Arabic.
The Marines there live in disgusting conditions. They have two toilets. One is a tube. For more serious business, there are the small plastic baggies called WAG bags. Do your business, seal it up and put it into a garbage can. They don’t complain.
Iraqis in every province I have traveled all respond to strong leadership. It’s a cultural touchstone. A man like SSG Rakene Lee is not someone they would overlook. Physically, the man is amazingly strong. But what is most amazing is the strength of his moral fiber. Whatever the man talked, he walked. After all of al Qaeda’s false promises, the people here have learned a hard lesson about the true value of character.
From the counterinsurgency manual that every Marine and Soldier should read:
1-139. U.S. forces start with a built-in challenge because of their reputation for accomplishment, what some call the “man on the moon syndrome.” This refers to the expressed disbelief that a nation able to put a man on the moon cannot quickly restore basic services. U.S. agencies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts should avoid making unrealistic promises. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. In other cultures, exorbitant promises are normal and people do not expect them to be kept. Effective counterinsurgents understand local norms; they use locally tailored approaches to control expectations. Managing expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN operations. In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the HN government than under an insurgent regime.
From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”
Over the next several days, I saw how much the Iraqis respected Rakene Lee and the other Marines who were all courageous, tactically competent, measured, and collectively and constantly telling even the Iraqis to go easy on the Iraqis. It’s people like Rakene Lee who are winning the moral high ground in Iraq. It is people like this who are devastating al Qaeda just by being themselves. Over those same several days, I would also see the Iraqi Lieutenant Hamid treat prisoners with respect and going out of his way to treat other Iraqis the way he saw Americans treating them. Lieutenant Hamid, in his young twenties, seemed to watch every move of the Marines and try to emulate them.
One night, after a long day out in the sun, when we were all were exhausted, I sat talking with Hamid. He told me how he’d lost his girlfriend of two years. She’d been studying banking in Baghdad, and when Hamid told her of his intentions to join the Iraqi Army, she replied that not only would she not marry him, but that she would break up. He said it was a very tough decision. Hamid’s father had been a soldier in Saddam’s Army, as had other relatives including uncles, some of whom died fighting.
When he told his girlfriend that he must go to the Iraqi Army, she left him. He told me, with remarkable sadness, “Women are crazy.”
Hamid said that he was so sick for two weeks he could hardly eat, and finally he went to a hospital and a doctor gave him an IV. When Hamid returned to duty, he decided he would be a soldier for life and might not ever get married. And then he said it again, “women are crazy,” but this time we laughed.
The Marines and his own commanders think highly of Hamid.
This comes straight from the new Counterinsurgency manual. The manual that everyone in the Marines and Army should read:
Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
1-153. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be “wrapped in a bodyguard of information.” While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress,
lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.” Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”
The Marines and some Iraqi Soldiers drove out one day to check on the “Coolie Village.” “Coolie” is a now derogatory term for manual laborers, often from Asia. A Marine wondered out loud why the Iraqis who live in Coolie Village call it Coolie Village, and I guessed (perhaps incorrectly) that the name can be traced back to the old British base nearby.
When the bomb detonated, the Iraqi Army, Police and American Marines evacuated and treated the wounded from the Coolie Village. I do not know for certain that al Qaeda committed these particular murders, but the Iraqis here told me it had been an al Qaeda attack.
In August, when people were groping for answers as to why about 400 Yazidis were murdered with bombs during an attack in Nineveh, the BBC and others asked me why I thought the Yazidis had been targeted.
Al Qaeda and related groups do not need reasons. They buy press with blood.
Coolie Village was without water because the bomb detonated over a water pipe. The village was under that dark spell. They had felt the hand of evil. Lieutenant Hamid and Iraqi Soldiers, along with Marines, walked around talking with the kids and the adults.
On Patrol
From the Counterinsurgency manual that every Soldier and Marine should read:
The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk
Must Be Accepted
1-151. This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”
While al Qaeda runs and hides, stuffing its death-cult down the throats of Iraqis in other areas, out in Anbar, once its domain, American Soldiers and Marines are increasingly able to go in small numbers out on patrols with Iraqis. This morning, only two Marines accompanied an Iraqi-led foot patrol several miles through an Iraqi village. It is important to note that at the time of this patrol, Soldiers who had recently been kidnapped elsewhere in combat were still missing. With no backup, our guys are able to perform such patrols in many parts of Iraq.
When you really talk with Iraqis, their problems (outside of the war) are mostly like people’s problems all over the world. The shepherds want the wild dogs to leave their flocks alone. They don’t want al Qaeda blowing up their villages and mosques. The farmers want the rains to start at just the right time and end at just the right time, and they want to be able to sell their crops and go about life. That’s just people. From Vietnam, to India, to Afghanistan to Iraq to Britain, the hierarchy of needs does not change.
Marines and Soldiers who are in areas of Anbar where fighting has abated are sometimes criticized by commanders who think they are avoiding contact with the enemy. I have heard this complaint at least a couple dozen times.
These Marines definitely weren’t avoiding contact. They were just winning.
Some of our own commanders believe that units who are not “in contact” or fighting here are perhaps not out beating the bushes enough. If there is a criticism of Marines on this, I heard Marines and American Army officers say on many occasions that some of the higher Marine command is stuck in the kinetic mindset, and this is very frustrating for Marines and Soldiers who realize that WHEN NOBODY IS SHOOTING IT MEANS YOU ARE WINNING.
End of Part 3
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