21 October 2022
Chiang Mai, Thailand
Expect increased infrastructure attacks from all sides. Overt, covert, and clandestine in nature.
An overt operation is an open operation. In overt operations, the sponsor makes little or no attempt to hide who did what to whom, and where.
Covert operations — usually the actual operation is known, such as a physical pipeline attack that leaves gas transmission ended and bubbling away from the sea. The sponsor may hide their identity for various reasons such as political or legal. For instance, though OGUS almost certainly made the attack, the culprit may not want Europeans who are dying of cold this winter to blame OGUS and its pals. (OGUS = Occupying Government United States).
In Clandestine operations, the actual mission itself may be completely or mostly hidden. Such as a journalist vanishing in April. Was that an operation, or is Meek on a long vacation, or what? The Stuxnet cyberattack was arguably clandestine — Iran knew that their centrifuge machines had problems, but they did not know the problem came from an attack until later, or that OGUS was involved until OGUS bragged about it.
I have been publishing for some time to expect covert operations against Norwegian gas flows. OGUS is just as likely to do this as is Russia or someone else. In this murky world, if OGUS were planning to disrupt Norwegian flows, OGUS may work to create information battle-space conditions favorable to blaming Russia. But then Russia has reason to actually hit the flows.
Vital Norwegian flows are especially at risk due to both OGUS/Globalists and Russia, both having means and motives. Norwegian energy infrastructure guardians must be more jittery than a long-tailed cat in a rocking chair factory.
Also, the Yamal gas flow and other infrastructure such as the bridge at Crimea all are at high risk.