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A P P E N D I X

DISCUSSION

General Effect Throughout the Moslem World of Imple-
mentation of the Report by the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry on Palestine.

1. General

The introduction of 100,000 Jews into Palestine would cause serious unrest throughout the Moslem World. In spite of internal disagreements among themselves over such matters as Sunnis against Shichs in religion and Hashimites against Saudites, and jealousy between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the one thing the Arab States agree on is opposition to Jewish immigration into Palestine. The entire Arab population of the Middle East, both Christian and Moslem, is backing the Arab League in its fight against the implementation of the Palestine report. Moslem elements outside of the Middle East, while not so vocal, also are opposed to the Jewish immigration.

A summarization of resentments as conceived by the Arabs and which have already been aroused, and which will be further embittered by an improper implementation of the report, may be expressed by the following generalizations:

a. Since 1918, the efforts to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine have been an integral part of British imperialism, part of British efforts to establish her domination in the Near East.

b. These efforts have in large measure been carried out without regard to the wishes of the local inhabitants and through the use of military force.

c. Today any action by the United States and Great Britain to impose a settlement of the Palestine problem without the consent of the local inhabitants and without the concurrence of the regional association of states most concerned, would constitute a gross breach of the principles which underlie the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations.

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1. The American support of Zionist aspirations is believed to stem from American unwillingness to materially increase her Jewish population and from political subservience to the Jewish vote. Under these circumstances, any U. S. action to impose Jewish settlement in the Near East is genuinely viewed as a complete negation of all moral principles upon which American reputation in the Near East has been established.

2. We believe that Arab reaction will be in direct proportion to the amount of force used by the U. S. and Great Britain in implementation of the Committee report. Full explanation to the Arab peoples of the terms of the report and, especially, of American determination to support unbiased implementation, plus a sincere effort on the part of Great Britain and the United States to meet legitimate Arab nationalist aspirations to share in the determination of Palestine's future would go far to modify the severity of repercussion to acts of extremists directed either toward guerrilla activity in Palestine or small scale sabotage in American or British installations. To a limited, but nevertheless significant extent, Arab political leaders outside Palestine would sacrifice their concept of Arab rights in Palestine in order to gain international recognition for the concept of a free, independent, Arab regional bloc within the limits of the United Nations Charter.

An imposed implementation, without the stipulations made above, would provoke violence on the part of the Arabs against both British and Jews. The Arabs of Palestine lack the capability of preventing implementation of the report. Their resistance would take the form of terrorism, of guerilla attacks, or organized mass disobedience calculated to challenge the police power and invite violent repression. Their strategy would seek to create the maximum of disorder and of police repression in order to justify an intervention on the part of other powers, of the U.N., or of public opinion in Great Britain and the United States. The length as well as the strength of Arab resistance in Palestine would be determined by the degree of support forthcoming from other Arab countries.

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3. Possibility of "Holy War" against all Occidentals.

The opposition to Zionist aspiration and to implementation of the report stems principally from the nationalism and anti-imperialism which is becoming so important a factor in the Near East, Asia, and Africa. Religious fanaticism, however, would be employed as an instrument of opposition.

At present there is no leader for a holy war unless the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Hasseni, or King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia assumes the leadership. However, it would not be necessary for a "Jihad" to be proclaimed by official decree; it might be started by the Arabs in Palestine with the thought that, under Moslem law, it would become a Moslem duty to volunteer support. This would result in individuals proceeding to Palestine for active service and violence in the form of terrorism and guerrilla warfare against Jewish and Christian communities in Africa, the Middle and Near East. The extent of this action depends on the degree of force used in implementation of the Anglo-American Report. If exhaustive attempts are made to obtain the cooperation of the regional association of Arab states prior to implementation of the report, we believe that initial bloodshed and property damage might well be heavy but that the violence would be short-lived -- a police operation rather than a long term military occupation.

4. Effect on British and American oil interests. None of the native Governments in the Near East could long survive if they attempted to support British or American interests while the British and American Governments were employing force to suppress the expression of Arab nationalist aspirations in Palestine. On the contrary, these Arab governments, in order to survive, would be forced to demonstrate their hostility to the Western Powers in every possible manner even though King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia has promised not to nullify American concessions in Saudi Arabia. We believe that an enforced solution of the Palestine problem would in all probability eventually make impossible or seriously impair the functioning of British and American installations, including oil and commercial air

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operations and educational institutions. Force used throughout the Arab States to maintain control of oil centers would not improve the situation since operation of the oil facilities in particular is dependent on native labor, which could not be controlled by force.

American oil companies control an estimated output (1946) of 47,000,150 bbls. coming from wells in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and Kuwait. American interests also have a 23.75% share in the British Controlled Iraq Petroleum Co. fields in Iraq, which have an estimated production (1946) of 36,500,000 bbls. Total yield from British concessions in Iran, Iraq (including American share), Kuwait and Egypt is estimated at approximately 192,350,000 bbls. Refinery installations, storage tanks and loading facilities at Haifa and Abadan and the BAPCO Refinery at Bahrein could be protected by the British. The refinery at Tripoli, Lebanon, the oil fields and installations at Kirkuk, Iraq, and the pipeline from Kirkuk to Tripoli (Lebanon) and Haifa are vulnerable to attack and sabotage by Moslem guerilla bands. The ARAMCO oil fields in Saudi Arabia, with refinery and loading facilities at Ras Tanura would have little or no protection. Kuwait would also be unprotected.

5. Effect on French and Spanish Arab colonies. Repercussions outside Palestine must be considered in respect to both geographical distribution and character. In general, significant reactions would be limited to the Arab states of the Near East plus Egypt and Libya. In French and Spanish North Africa intense sympathy would be aroused which would serve to develop the nationalist resistance in those areas. Individuals would proceed to Palestine for active service and violence might well develop against local Jewish communities, but we believe that these repercussions would not tax the capability of the local police force.

6. Effect on Soviet efforts to align the Moslems towards the USSR. There is no doubt that Soviet propaganda is winning some Arab support. This results not from interest in Communism but from the intensity of Arab feeling in regard to national independence and to Arab doubts that Great Britain and particularly

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The United States are seriously interested in Arab aspirations. Arab reliance on the USSR is tempered by the realization of their leaders that an increase of Soviet influence in the Near East would present a threat to their position as wealthy landlords and capitalists, by their awareness of Soviet actions in Iran and Eastern Europe, and Soviet reliance on force. However, if the British or Americans resort to force to impose a solution in Palestine it must be assumed that the Arabs would react as would any other people -- the actuality of Anglo-American force and repression would far outweigh the potentiality of subsequent Soviet domination.

More serious in the long run would be the consequent inevitable trend toward Arab political and economic reliance on the USSR in order to withstand Anglo-American hostility. Participation by the USSR in the development of the oil industry and civil aviation throughout the Near East would become inevitable unless blocked by the use of military force. Turkey would be further isolated and Soviet penetration of Iran facilitated. The use of force by the Anglo-American powers against the Arabs to settle the Palestine problem will serve to advance the Soviet zone of influence to Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean except insofar as Anglo-American military superiority in those areas is built up and maintained.

In addition, it is probable that the USSR would raise the Palestine question in the U. N. Council, thereby establishing the USSR's right to participate in the settlement of the Palestine problem and further extending Soviet activities into the Near East.

7. Moslem assistance which might move to Palestine from other areas. An enforced implementation would set up a chain of events of unlimited duration. A substantial though unpredictable number of volunteers would seek guerrilla action inside Palestine. Every resulting Arab death would be utilized to create martyrs and thus to create throughout the Near East centers for the inflaming of passions. With continued repression, popular resentment would grow and mob action be encouraged.

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8. Amount and effectiveness of possible Soviet assistance.

To date the USSR has not committed itself to support either of the parties in the Palestine dispute as against the other. Encouragement has been given cautiously to both sides while Soviet propaganda has made use of every opportunity to inflame both parties against the United States and Great Britain. In general, the weight of overt Soviet propaganda support has been on the Arab side.

The USSR has the capability of supplying arms, munitions, and trained Moslem officers and technicians through Iran to the Arab states. We do not believe that such aid would be effective inside Palestine, but it would increase materially the burden of restoring order in the other Near Eastern states. If the very fact of British or Anglo-American military intervention would not serve to reduce the Near East to a state of general anarchy, we believe that Soviet aid -- military, political, propaganda -- would certainly achieve this end.

9. Jewish capabilities in Palestine. On the Jewish side, the significant opposition to be expected within Palestine, as opposed to American Jewish sentiment, is fundamentally nationalist rather than religious or humanitarian. The Palestinian leadership is believed to be committed to attainment of Zionist claims to Trans-Jordan, South Syria, as well as Palestine.

The illegal Jewish army, Hagana, has a trained force of 65,000 and a reserve of 40,000. The Jews are well equipped with small arms, and have reserves of munitions hidden. They are prepared for a short defensive war against the British, and are well equipped to stand off the Arabs until overwhelmed by numbers. However, their main threat would be in guerrilla warfare in which they are trained. Their underground is in reality an organized army with fairly competent leaders, military training and some combat experience.

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We believe that the introduction of 100,000 Jews into Palestine would appreciably increase the military capabilities of the Jewish underground. To date the illegal Jewish Army, Hagana, has had a policy of bringing in physically fit youths, many of whom are trained in underground activities, through agents planted in Europe. Women and children cannot be ruled out, as women are used in the Hagana, and children receive military training in the Betar. Thus, it should be assumed that a good many of the immigrants would be trained in underground activities, and carefully selected by the Agency, and of great aid to the Hagana in the event of guerrilla activities. If all the 100,000 Jews are men, they could be of great assistance because:

- a. Some of them will have had combat experience and training.
- b. Jews in the Allied Zones in Europe have from all evidence received adequate treatment and should be in from average to good physical condition.
- c. While the exact quantity of arms controlled by the Jews is unknown, they are known to be in the possession of large stores of weapons which have been either smuggled in or manufactured in Palestine. We believe that these are sufficient to equip a strong guerrilla organization which would be a serious threat to the present British force.

In view of the good organization of Jewish extremists and the disciplined nationalism of Palestinian Jewish colonists, it must be assumed that even under the best of conditions the British authorities would face a greatly augmented campaign of terrorism. The suppression of such terrorism would require either the cooperation of the Jewish masses or a starkly brutal campaign. To the extent that implementation was begun without exhaustive attempts to explain the program to the rank and file, the severity of the required suppression would have to be augmented.

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10. World-wide Jewish aid. In the Near East, outside Palestine and in North Africa, the Jews are utterly incapable of taking any action in support of the Palestinian Jews and would have no inclination to do so. In general, repercussions on the part of Jews outside Palestine would be limited to the United States and the United Kingdom and to the zones in Europe occupied by these two powers. World Jewry would undoubtedly come to the aid of the Zionists with money, smuggling of arms and attempts at illegal immigration.

11. Coercive action by Jewish or Pro-Jewish organizations.

Although it is believed that Jewish organizations in the United States and Great Britain will use wide-spread propaganda to sway public and government opinion toward Zionist aspirations, a discussion of coercive action in the United States and Great Britain is considered a domestic problem, and as such is outside the authority of the Intelligence agencies.

Estimate of the Ability of British Forces, Without U. S. Troop Assistance, to Maintain Order in all Areas of the British Empire or Sphere of Influence Affected by Wide Spread Moslem or Jewish Unrest.

12. British military capabilities in Palestine. Information received from the British War Office indicates that 70,000 British troops are stationed in Palestine and that approximately 45,000 of this total are combat troops. It is possible that reinforcements have increased this number since the last strength report was received.

Owing to the limited size of Palestine, the limited nature of resources available to the natives and the superior British equipment and organization, order could be restored and thereafter maintained in Palestine by the British forces now available, without U. S. troop assistance, even in the case of violence offered by both Jews and Arabs.

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13. British military capabilities in the Middle and Near East. As has been stated above, enforced implementation of the report would lead to widespread disorders throughout Arab lands. To restore, and thereafter maintain, order by force would require the occupation by troops of key points in each Arab state and the maintenance of lines of communication between all of these points and the ports. In no instance would the occupying forces be faced by serious military resistance. On the other hand, the deployment of troops and the use of military force throughout the territories of supposedly sovereign states would arouse national resistance and fanaticism far outweighing the present resentment over Palestine felt by the Arabs. We believe that in each state, as in Palestine, the Arabs would not only conduct guerrilla warfare but would organize demonstrations intended to provoke violent repression by the British. Every effort would be directed toward inflaming not only local but world opinion against the occupant.

The wide areas which would have to be covered and the long lines of communication involved would require the deployment of very substantial forces simply to hold key centers. To bring an end to Arab resistance would require much larger forces and the use of very severe repression. To protect British and American installations and the principal centers of Christian and Jewish population, and at the same time to crush Arab resistance within a period of about two years, would require the use of the equivalent of 5 - 7 divisions, plus a substantial air force. This is in addition to the forces which would be required to maintain order in Palestine itself. We believe that the maintenance of such forces and the maintenance of reduced forces for an indefinite period after the principal operations had been completed, would result in manpower and financial burdens which would be extremely difficult for the British to support.

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In the light of the Tension Created in the Arab States by the Palestine Affair, the Effect on the Moslem World of not Meeting Arab Demands for Immediate Independence of Former Italian Colonies, but of Placing These Colonies (Including Tripolitania) Under Trusteeship.

14. It is generally believed by those familiar with Arab matters that if there were no Palestine problem the Arabs would be equally inflamed over the question of Libya. The fact is that Libya has been the one area in which Arab nationalism has met European imperialism in open war -- for twenty years since 1918. Even more significant is the fact that in Libya, Arab forces have demonstrated military capacity and an ability to resist despite extreme terrorism. Arabs from all Near Eastern countries fought in Libya and a number of them are now included in the inner circle of Arab nationalist leaders in the Middle East.

15. As on the Palestine question, Arab nationalist leadership is committed to a settlement of the Libyan problem in a manner which will recognize the right of Arab states to have a substantial voice in the settlement. In the case of both areas, recognition of this right is fundamentally more important than the details of settlement. In the case of Libya, as of Palestine, an approach to the problem on the part of the Great Powers which will recognize this principle will go far toward achieving compromise solutions safeguarding the interests of all parties.

16. Failure to meet Arab demands for Libya while the Western Powers were engaged in enforcing a Palestine settlement would not materially affect the situation in the Near East. It would, however, make inevitable the extension of hostilities to all parts of Libya. To maintain their position in Libya, the Italians were reportedly obliged to mount major military campaigns and to suppress revolt by wiping out all centers of habitation outside a few key points. We presume that British forces in Libya would be evacuated or would attempt to hold only the important ports.

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Such a course, however, would lead to a further deterioration in the British military position in Egypt and the Sudan, both of which would be open to attack from Libya with considerable encouragement from within those countries.

17. Therefore, failure to meet Arab demands for immediate independence of the former Italian Colony of Libya (including Tripolitania and Cirenaica) while instead placing this colony under trusteeship of a number of states, either including or excluding Italy, will not materially affect the situation in the Near East, providing the Arab States have a substantial voice in the settlement. However, an enforced implementation of the Anglo-American report on Palestine would likely result in hostilities in Libya against any occupying power, especially if at the same time the colony was again placed under sole Italian trusteeship.