

October 6, 2010

The Honorable John McHugh
Secretary of the Army
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0101

Dear Secretary McHugh:

Today we have the finest soldiers that I have served with in nearly thirty years of active duty and three wars. Yet we have been fought to a stand-still by an illiterate, religiously-inspired, incompetent enemy. As we discussed a few weeks ago, I am submitting this letter to highlight the fact that current counterinsurgency doctrine is inconsistent with American values and tradition. This is the primary reason our military operational art continuously fails.


The attached appendix details a few of these inconsistencies. The new doctrinal methods espoused by senior leaders in the field can force irrelevant and unattainable goals upon soldiers because they are designed to achieve objectives unrelated to preserving the American way of life for Americans—which is a fundamentally different notion from trying to extend democracy to foreigners.

During our conversation you asked for recommendations. I recommend that our current doctrine be withdrawn immediately because it is so ill-conceived. Additionally, because the Army has developed doctrine that diverges from a soldier's oath to the Constitution and Code of Conduct to the American people, I further recommend that the culture of today's Army officer corps be immediately and rigorously examined to determine if our concern for the Army as an institution and desire to be good international partners has compromised our willingness to serve the American public.

Army officers are subordinate to the public, not superior to the citizen. Many officers take this responsibility seriously but there are also some who do not. In times of national peril the greatest soldiers have embraced their obligation to the citizen and that that is why our republic has survived and in fact flourished.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit these matters. Please use this letter in any way that you feel appropriate and share it as you think necessary.

Very respectfully yours,



HARRY D. TUNNELL IV
Colonel, United States Army

In any discussion of Army doctrine one of the first things to consider is the expectations of the American people for their Army. These expectations, often expressed through elected representatives, are quite clear. Congress has charged the Army with “overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.”¹ This is an unequivocal charter to the Army and it is expressed without reference to the type of war, complexity of the operational environment, or needs of a contested population.

The Army in its capstone doctrine *The Army* acknowledges the responsibility assigned to it by the American people:

The Army, a long-trusted institution, **exists to serve the Nation**. As part of the joint force, the Army supports and defends America’s Constitution and way of life against all enemies, foreign and domestic. **The Army** protects national security interests, including, forces, possessions, citizens, allies, and friends. It prepares for and **delivers decisive action in all operations**. Above all, **the Army** provides combatant commanders with versatile land forces ready to **fight and win the Nation’s wars**.² [Emphasis added.]

In *The Army* the first element in a list of responsibilities as the landpower component of any joint force is to “impose the Nation’s will on adversaries—by force if necessary—in diverse and complex terrain.”³ Without restriction the capstone manual defining the role of the Army denotes a responsibility to defeat any type of enemy anywhere.

However, **Army leaders ignore their responsibility to the American people with the emphasis on foreign populations in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine today**. Furthermore Army leaders freely commit non-military resources—that they do not control—to a war fighting activity. The COIN doctrine states that:

COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that **the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone**.⁴ [Emphasis added.]

¹ United States Code Title 10, Section 3062.

² Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, *The Army* (US Government: Washington, DC, June 2005), 1-1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (US Government: Washington, DC, December 2006), 1-1. Hereafter referred to as FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*.

There are myriad logical inconsistencies in the doctrine that make it difficult to believe it offers any model for success. For example the doctrine's authors posit that "COIN campaigns are often long and difficult."⁵ Later they state that "protracted COIN operations [for the counterinsurgent] are hard to sustain."⁶ Yet in a few short pages the doctrine writers announce that "protracted conflicts favor insurgents."⁷ In the end they hedge their bets about the efficacy of the doctrine by quibbling: "However, COIN operations are complicated, and even following the principles and imperatives does not guarantee success."⁸ The authors state that the longer the war continues the more advantage accrues to the insurgent and the only solution that they propose is a long campaign! Army COIN doctrine does not describe how to design operations for "overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States."⁹ There are so many flawed syllogisms in today's COIN doctrine that it is impossible to understand and implement.

For the first time in our nation's military history the Army is formally refusing to apply military power as directed by the American people. The idea that soldiers have the ability to pick and choose the kinds of wars that they are willing to fight and win is now entrenched in Army doctrine and leader thought. The other capstone manual for the Army is FM 3-0 *Operations* and it clearly places limitations on what army forces will do during time of war:

Military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to exert their full influence.¹⁰ [Emphasis added.]

Not only have Army leaders decided what the military will and will not accomplish during war, Army doctrine for the first time and without the sanction of the American people, commits other instruments of national power to combat.

⁵ Ibid., x.

⁶ Ibid., 1-2.

⁷ Ibid., 1-6.

⁸ Ibid., 1-20.

⁹ People believe that we are fighting an insurgency but the fact is that Afghanistan and Iraq were sovereign nations on September 11, 2001. The United States did not recognize the Taliban government but a few countries did—even without recognition the Taliban was the *de facto* government of Afghanistan. Iraq certainly had an internationally recognized government. We did not decisively defeat the original enemy; the enemy merely adapted to a new environment by reorganizing as guerrillas whose tactics include terrorism. By definition one cannot fight an insurgency if one never finished the original job and in essence we are fighting elements of the original leadership from the beginning of the war. The fact that Al Qaeda, nationalist, and other groups are present or allied with elements of the original leadership in each region does not make the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq insurgencies.

¹⁰ Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *The Army* (US Government: Washington, DC, February 2008), 2-1.

Army leaders are stating that the Army will not take the lead as the landpower component to fight and win the nation's contemporary wars. This is the reason that the nation faces an era of persistent conflict—because the officer corps today is not willing to lead the Army in delivering decisive action against the enemy. The operational concept for irregular warfare from the Army's capstone doctrine reinforces this idea:

Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare [irregular warfare], but it **is not decisive**. The effective application of **military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert their influence.**¹¹

Because of these Army attitudes it is my contention that: “*Current COIN doctrine has resulted in tactical approaches and operational art so inconsistent with American values, that United States military campaigns cannot accomplish security objectives satisfactory to the American people.*”

To fully understand the problems with this unintentional but *de facto* usurpation of the authority of civilian leaders, it is important to address the relationship of COIN dogma to America's economic potential. Many issues today that are important to American economic security simply cannot get the emphasis they deserve. Because of COIN dogma the State Department is consumed with the war so it cannot adequately prioritize one of its core functions—to protect the nation's economic interests internationally.¹²

A recent example of this phenomenon occurred when the Secretary of State chastised China, Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam, and others for restrictive internet policy but was silent about restrictions on Facebook by Pakistan and Bangladesh. (Facebook is reportedly an \$800 million company.¹³) The State Department has a conflict of interest; since it is in charge of COIN it has a full time responsibility to pursue South Asian support for combat operations. Consequently the business interests of Americans may be put on the back burner so the department can meet its recently minted war time responsibilities to prosecute COIN in South Asia.

¹¹ Ibid., 2-10.

¹² Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 51-52. The Department of State is supposed to lead and oversee the nation's COIN efforts and the Department of Defense provides a broad range of capabilities to support the “counterinsurgency effort.”

¹³ CNET News Staff, “Report: Facebook ‘09 revenues as high as \$800 M,” *Digital Media—CNET News*, June 19, 2010 1:15 PM PDT, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20008246-93.html. Declan McCallagh, “Bill: China Net censorship could start trade war,” *Politics and Law—CNET News*, July 2, 2010 10:41 AM PDT, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20009588-38.html?tag=mncol:mlt_related. Internet policy is becoming increasingly important to American commerce. Facebook was blocked because a Seattle cartoonist suggested an “Everybody Draw Mohammed Day!” to support the creators of “South Park” after the threats to Comedy Central. The Seattle cartoonist, Molly Norris, has now been threatened by an American Muslim cleric believed to be in Yemen. See Chris Grygiel, “Report: Seattle cartoonist on terrorist hit list,” *seattlepi Local*, July 11, 2001, 4:41 p.m. PT.

Having the nation's diplomatic infrastructure design and implement America's war strategy clearly detracts from its historical responsibility to support American businesses.¹⁴

Additionally, the military has become so sensitive to Muslim ethics due to COIN's emphasis on foreign populations that Military Customs Inspectors will confiscate a personal copy of the Qur'an from soldiers redeploying from combat unless he or she claims to be Muslim.¹⁵ Thus the American military is ignoring its professional responsibility to study the motivation of a clearly Islamic-inspired enemy who conducted direct attacks upon the domestic territory of the United States and continues to attack American personnel in South and Southwest Asia. Islam is central to enemy operations and soldiers have a professional duty to study their enemy—unless one changes the focus from the enemy to the population.

COIN is in part an evolution of post-Viet Nam era Cold War military thought that the new way of American war requires contributions from all of the nation's instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.¹⁶ These Cold War approaches morphed into a population-centric dogma in which a foreign population has become the center of gravity.¹⁷ Rather than overwhelm the enemy, COIN requires years of commitment to develop institutions designed to solve underlying problems that caused the insurgency.¹⁸ This is not consistent with American tradition and the Constitution does not organize the government to sustain military conflict over long periods of time—the Constitution is essentially a document that describes American's economic instrument of national power.¹⁹

¹⁴ The first treaty after the Colonies declared independence from Great Britain was the September 17, 1776 "Model Treaty." This treaty served as the framework for commercial treaties that the United States would make in the future and the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France was based upon it. The Department of State has historically been devoted to America's economic instrument of national power. See the website of the Department of State Office of the Historian for more detail.

¹⁵ The author's personal recollection of redeployment operations at Manas-Ganci Air Base in July 2010 while returning from Afghanistan as a brigade commander.

¹⁶ FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1 describes the importance of all of the instruments of national power; the theme is throughout the doctrine. Interestingly enough Osama Bin Laden has always recognized the importance of attacking the American economy and considers it an essential military target. See Lawrence, Bruce, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005) for more on this subject and its importance to enemy strategy.

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that post-WW II major wars (Korea, Viet Nam, and the Global War on Terror) have been failures and short duration military operations have a mixed record. The United States has not won a large-scale war since the Department of Defense was established in 1947 and the record in other military operations is varied.

¹⁸ Dr. Conrad Crane, "Minting COIN: Principles and Imperatives for Combating Insurgency," *Air & Space Power Journal*, Winter 2007, 1-3, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07/crane.html>. *Counterinsurgency Guide*, Preface, 12.

¹⁹ The 1787 Constitutional Convention convened based upon recommendations in the report of the Annapolis Convention the year prior. The American economy was failing under the

Next it is appropriate to turn to the cultural inappropriateness of today's Army doctrine. Its employability by the American soldier is limited because the concepts it conveys are foreign to his or her education, socialization, and world-view.

It is difficult for American soldiers to understand or implement the doctrine and for American citizens to embrace the outcomes of the kinds of military operations it espouses because the doctrine evolved from colonial and imperial models which have already been rejected by Americans. History has shown that the diplomatic and military behaviors in support of colonial and imperial aspirations are bigoted and exploitative political activities.

The fact is that the authors of today's COIN doctrine ignored American core values when they wrote the manual. They were thus inept at understanding basic notions of American society, culture, political organization, and military art and science.

It is absolutely undeniable that European models were promoted by the team that put together what has become United States counterinsurgency strategy. Perversely the body of literature about centuries of uniquely American operations against irregular adversaries has been largely ignored. Once the authors selected a European paradigm they were committed to dismissing the history of successful American wars because our processes and results are incompatible with those of colonial and imperial military activity.

It is easy to demonstrate—from the words of the authors—that current COIN doctrine is derived almost exclusively from the patently un-American notions of colonialism and imperialism.

Dr. Conrad Crane, the Director of the US Army Military History Institute, was the lead author for the new doctrine. Crane, when describing his inspiration wrote that “David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, and Roger Trinquier still have much useful information for current practitioners of counterinsurgency (COIN).”²⁰ He amplified the importance of these foreign military officers when he acknowledged that “When the Army-Marine Corps writing team for Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, began their deliberations, they turned to the study of

government formed in the Articles of Confederation and a new one was needed to prevent national collapse. The un-amended Constitution formed a government to protect and promote American economic security. This includes military clauses for a navy to protect sea lanes of commerce and restrictions on the army to keep costs low and prevent coups. The idea of a separation of powers is to prevent an oligarchy that could control national wealth.

²⁰ Crane, 1.

European colonial activities to develop a baseline list of principles upon which to build the new doctrinal manual.”²¹

Dr. John Nagl is a retired Army officer and the President of the Center for a New American Security—a think tank with close ties to several American general officers. Nagl was a member of the counterinsurgency manual writing team and in a *Joint Forces Quarterly* article he explains that “It is true that the manual draws heavily from the “classical” counterinsurgency theorists such as David Galula and Sir Robert Thompson and their experiences combating Maoist insurgencies and anticolonial conflicts that marked the first two decades of the Cold War.”²²

Dr. Montgomery McFate, a leader in the development of the Army’s Human Terrain System program and a co-author of the chapter on intelligence, has also publically commented on the origins of the doctrine. She noted during discussion as a member of a November 17, 2006 American Anthropological Association panel that colonialism was used as a model for COIN.²³ It is noteworthy that several of McFate’s publications show a decidedly obvious deference to concepts from colonial and imperial military activity.²⁴

Perhaps the most well-known of the doctrinal manual’s contributors is Dr. David Kilcullen. The retired Australian Army officer has developed a reputation as a COIN “expert” and he has been an advisor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, General Petraeus, and most recently General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan. This influential author in his book *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* clearly states that modern COIN is derived from the colonial small wars and imperial policing lessons of empire.²⁵

It is incontrovertible that the basic framework for America’s 21st Century COIN strategy is the lesson of empire that employed international engagement strategies committed to taking advantage of other civilizations for the purpose of enriching the mother country—the *fundamental purpose of colonialism and imperialism*. History teaches that the one significant thing the United States, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have in common is that *each rejected the colonial and imperial aspirations of others*.

²¹ Ibid.

²² John A. Nagl, “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 58, 3rd Quarter 2010, 118.

²³ Roberto J. González, “Towards mercenary anthropology?: The new US Army counterinsurgency manual *FM 3-24* and the military-anthropology complex,” *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (June 2007): 15, 17.

²⁴ “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship” in the March-April 2005 *Military Review* and “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition” in the January-February 2006 *Military Review* are such examples.

²⁵ Paraphrased from David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv.

Appendix to Colonel Tunnell Letter to Secretary McHugh

It is also germane to address the research quality of the doctrine since part of its allure is the academic credentials of its authors and the military leaders whose reputation is associated with the theory it presents. The Army's FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* is an exceptionally unprofessional piece of writing. The contributors to the manual are amateurs, contractors, academics, or others with little practical American military experience. It contains plagiarized material from academic and military journals and many of the ideas it presents about operational design, intelligence, and information operations have no foundation in prior doctrine and are not descriptive of wide-spread best practice.²⁶

Additionally the assertions made by many that today's war is a new type of war for the United States are wholly and completely false. The first overseas wars fought by the United States were the Barbary Wars. These military actions were against an Islamic-inspired enemy and American victory in these wars resulted in the establishment of the principle of freedom of the seas. The fact is that historically there is much to learn from American military operations against religiously-inspired irregular foes that relied on terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

There is a wealth of information and practical experience, good and bad, available to anyone researching how Americans fight in such environments. Army doctrine for fighting precisely the type of irregular enemy that operated in Afghanistan and Iraq early on exists in the 1986 FM 90-8 *Counterinsurgency Operations*. A Combat Training Center, the Army's Joint readiness Training Center, was established in 1987 to specifically train Army units how to fight an irregular adversary.²⁷ The Army had the right doctrine and training to succeed in this war, it was simply ignored. The reason for a lack of success today is not one of doctrine or experience it is a problem of competence.

²⁶ For example lines of operation are obviously plagiarized from Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, *Military Review*, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," July-August 2005, 4-17; Appendix A is also clearly plagiarized, see Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army, *Military Review*, "Twenty-Eight Articles": Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," May-June 2006, 103-108; the military has a doctrinal framework for Information Operations (IO) but the concepts for counterinsurgency IO have no basis in best practice or doctrine yet they are clearly given the status of both in Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (US Government: Washington, DC, December 2006), 5-8 – 5-11. The González essay highlights enough academic plagiarism to detract considerably from the credibility of the doctrine. The manual is replete with opinion, errors, plagiarism, and poor scholarship. Even if authors gave permission to use their material that is not relevant—the use of such material is misleading because one assumes that doctrine is a compilation of best practice or deliberate analysis. These essays clearly do not meet those standards.

²⁷ The Joint Readiness Training Center was established at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas and transferred operations to its current location at Fort Polk, Louisiana March 12, 1993. The center was designed to train units to fight a guerrilla adversary that conducted operations in small teams and occasionally employed terrorist tactics.

Before September 11, 2001 there was already a wealth of high quality research within the Army such as Andrew Birtle's 1997 book, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. The Center of Military History (<http://www.history.army.mil/>) has a substantial collection of books, staff rides, and other materials that describe operations against guerrillas and insurgents. The Army's Combat Studies Institute (<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/>) also has useful materials that could have been used to outline a way of war consistent with the values of *Americans*. The National Archives, various collections about military operations against Indians, the historical record of the War of the Rebellion, and many other sources are all part of the rich fabric of American military history that should inform United States doctrine about irregular warfare in support of the American people.²⁸

It is a fact of *American* military history that insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists can be defeated primarily with the military instrument of national power. It is also a fact of technology that the capability to accomplish such a task is in America's military arsenal. Any decision about how long a war should take—the *Long War theory*—is a statement of policy and not history or capability.

A review of sources referenced in FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* will lead one to the conclusion that the mass of historical documents describing American victories against irregular forces have been largely ignored. Successful American wars against irregular forces typically do not last for long periods. Colonial and imperial adventurism places emphasis on manipulating an indigenous society—which takes decades. NATO allies support COIN because it is consistent with their own history and cultural tradition. Americans, on the other hand, have consistently rejected concepts similar to COIN many times.

One of the most famous examples of this rejection relates to Rudyard Kipling's 1899 poem "The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands." Kipling was attempting to encourage an American sense of Imperialism in the new territories wrested from Spain. Americans, however, were increasingly viewing colonial and imperial conquest as an unethical practice to manipulate less developed populations. The current International Security Forces-Afghanistan strategy, unfortunately shares many concepts with Kipling's poetry "we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance."²⁹ A critical

²⁸ COIN is likely a result of "decision-based evidence making" in which a substantial body of evidence contrary to the desired decision is ignored. For a further exposition of the concept see the online version of Peter M. Tungling and Michael J. Brydon, "Is Decision-Based Evidence Making Necessarily Bad?" *MIT Sloan Management Review*, June 26, 2010. The authors write "But what is troubling is that many managers who believe they have committed their organizations to evidence-based decision making (and have made hefty investments to back up this commitment) have committed instead to decision-based evidence making."

²⁹ General Stanley McChrystal, "Commander's Initial Assessment," Kabul: Headquarters International Security Force, August 30, 2009, 1-1.

component of empire is keeping costs low—that is why it is important to build indigenous military capacity or employ mercenaries.³⁰

A form of colonial service is essential so that small numbers of specially trained and educated people can guide the population in ways consistent with the needs of the colonial power. It is a matter of cost and influence and not a benevolent desire to help an ingenious population. Af-Pak groups in the Department of Defense, building Afghan and Iraqi capacity, an emphasis on reintegration and reconciliation programs, and willingness to negotiate with the Taliban enemy are more reflective of colonial and imperial thought than American military tradition.

Even though Kipling clearly packaged his poem as a message to the United States about the *duty* of the white man to take care of the “savage half-devil half-child” it did not get much traction. The United States, while remaining a deeply segregated society, rejected the idea of the white man’s burden. 19th and early 20th Century media responded with satirical poems, derisive cartoons, and citizens formed social groups to disparage the idea of a white man’s burden. 100 years ago the media helped display America’s contempt for the idea. The same concepts, packaged as doctrine, are considered appropriate military strategy by the media and many senior uniformed leaders today.

³⁰ Colonial American grievances included British demands to cheaply billet soldiers in American homes—the practice was one of the “Intolerable Acts”—and haphazard British taxation strategies. The British needed to raise funds to pay costs to maintain troops in North America and sustain continual wars with France.



THE WHITE (I) MAN'S BURDEN.

1899 Life Magazine Satire of Kipling's Poem

A critical assumption of the white man's burden is that an indigenous population cannot humanely and successfully govern themselves. The United States generally does not ascribe to such assumptions—and that is the point.³¹ This un-American construct infests current United States military thought about warfare and results in commanders spending more time on governance than in the field with their soldiers.

The Northern Alliance was allied with the United States at the beginning of the war and *recognized* as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by the United Nations before September 11, 2001. But this erstwhile government was rejected as soon as it had opportunity to exercise its *de jure* authority. Now Afghanistan lives with a Pashtu president who has a past relationship with the Taliban and currently seeks reconciliation with them. Furthermore groups such as

³¹ The United States has a history of affording mechanisms to its protectorates and territories that provide opportunities to change status. For example the Philippines became independent, Hawaii became a state, and Puerto Rico remains a territory. The United States has, of course, fought punitive wars and wars for territory such as the Indian Wars and the War with Mexico but the objectives of these types of wars were clear.

the Taliban are culturally accepted in Afghanistan—they are reflective of a long tradition of Pashtu religiously-inspired movements.³² United States leaders should have understood this fact before they rejected the Northern Alliance ally and placed a man from a culturally-sympathetic ethnicity to its enemy in charge

For more than a decade the international community maintained no-fly zones over parts of Iraq to protect Kurds and Shiite Arabs from attack by Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. Yet the United States, at first opportunity installed as the interim president of Iraq a Shiite who is a former Baath Party member.

One must ask is it even possible to conduct campaigns consistent with American needs now that Afghanistan and Iraq require all laws to be consistent with the provisions of Islam.³³ While it may be appropriate to acknowledge cultural and religious tradition in a political document it is inconsistent with American core values to disenfranchise millions of people because they are not the right religion.³⁴

A fundamental goal of Al Qaeda is for Islam to dominate every part of the daily life of its adherents and this is not a radical point of view, quite the contrary it is consistent with the Qur'an. The religion also goes outside the scope of Muslims and clearly places demands on non-Muslims too. People who are not Muslim must "submit" to Islam and agree to live under its protection—Islamic engagement with non-Muslims is more reflective of a political rather than a religious activity. *The United States by trying to manipulate Muslim populations rather than destroy its enemy has perversely become an "accidental mujahedeen" that actually accomplishes part of Al Qaeda's goals for them.*³⁵

There are too many similarities in outcome in such different countries to accept that these results are coincidence rather than deliberate. In each case someone with past associations with America's enemy, but reportedly acceptable to all sides is put in power and religion becomes a permanent fixture of law and

³² Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), 53 - 54 describes the fact that there is a history of such movements among the Pashtu. The main difference with the Taliban is foreign support but the idea of a *jihad* in southern Afghanistan is culturally consistent with Pashtu tradition.

³³ See Articles 1 - 3, Constitution of Afghanistan and Articles 2 - 3, Constitution of Iraq.

³⁴ One of the most famous instances is requiring Jews and Christians to pay a "poll tax" and submit to Islam which can be found at Surah 9:29 in the *Qur'an*, this requirement is known as the *Jizyah*. There are daily examples of repression and discrimination throughout South and Southwest Asia that can be attributed to Islam or local cultural interpretations of Islam.

³⁵ COIN was not fully codified until FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* was issued in 2006 but even before its publication there was emphasis on all instruments of national power to support military operations. The emphasis on religion in constitutions is not how Muslims themselves have always done it. Turkey requires a secular republican form of government and this is one of the aspects of the constitution that cannot be amended *or even proposed for amendment*. See the Constitution of Turkey Articles 1 - 4.

government. This is not the political tradition of the United States where patronage is reserved for one's allies and exclusion for one's competitors. The United States obviously designed abnormal political structures that American soldiers are, according to COIN doctrine, fighting and dying to *enhance*.

America's indigenous allies, who were good enough at the beginning of the war, were considered too ill-equipped to accept the reins of power once the Taliban and Baath Party were toppled. They became the West's burden—and the ability to satisfy the national security needs of the American citizen was discarded. The end result is that the United States, in less than 10 years, has created more internationally recognized Islamic governments than Iran in its entire post-1979 history.

The point is not to place the blame for these governments upon the shoulders of those who developed and promote COIN but to understand that the creation of this environment in Afghanistan and Iraq is consistent with the history of colonialism and imperialism. A basic idea of colonial and imperial military activity is to co-opt groups believed to be power brokers so that they can manage the population on behalf of the mother country. It is instructive because it highlights that rather than to defeat the enemy through force of arms, COIN requires American soldiers to promote, suffer injury for, and die to sustain social behavior and institutions that are despicable to the American citizen and do not meet the security requirements of our republic.

The notion of "The White Man's Burden" has long been rejected in America. Similar arguments were used to explain away slavery in the American South before the War of the Rebellion.³⁶ Those claims did not hold water then and the nation went to war to triumph over the scourge of slavery. But in the dawn of the 21st Century, the American military has adopted an approach that has already been rejected by the citizen.

If the American public does not care about the development of Iraqi and Afghan capacity—they just want to see the enemy destroyed—then, is the Army not at odds with the polity?³⁷ Yes, of course it is, particularly if it creates doctrine that states that such wars cannot be won with the military instrument of national power. There is a substantial body of Americans who believe that the purpose of an Army at war is to destroy the enemy. Yet for nearly a decade we have allowed the enemy who attacked our Nation on September 11, 2001, his allies, fellow travellers, and supporters to survive.

³⁶ Orville Vernon Burton, *The Age of Lincoln* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 41.

³⁷ Eric Kuhn, "Gen. Casey: America may be in Iraq and Afghanistan for another decade," *CNNPolitics, politickticker* ..., July 10, 2010 1:29 p.m. ET. (Online.) This highlights that the Army has decided upon a long-term strategy for the war on terrorism.

In actuality, the best security results that occur due to today's COIN doctrine accrue to the enemy. COIN provides an excuse to ignore the difficult task to destroy or defeat the enemy. COIN provides a new mission for officers who rationalize a focus on information to define an environment that reportedly affects *populations* rather than American combat units.³⁸ Because of the COIN paradigm Americans do not understand how the enemy operates—so the enemy retains the freedom of maneuver to continue to successfully attack Americans.

An Army that will not destroy or defeat the enemy cannot meet the needs of the American citizen.

³⁸ “This vast and underappreciated body of information [polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)], almost all of which is unclassified, **admittedly offers few clues about where to find insurgents**, but it does provide elements of even greater strategic importance – a map for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency itself.” Paul D. Batchelor, Michael T. Flynn, and Matt Pottinger, “Fixing Intel: Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” *Center for a New American Security: Voices From the Field*, January 2010, 7. [Emphasis added.]